As everyone surely knows by now, the SMU Steel Summit starts on Monday in Atlanta, Ga. So, this is a great opportunity to reflect on how much has changed since the 2024 Summit. Certainly, no one could have imagined the wholesale and transformative changes to U.S. and global trade policy.
As the president’s August 1 tariff deadline approaches, the “Let’s Make a Deal” game show returns to primetime (the Monty Hall version, of course). As the administration begins rolling out trade deals, we are starting to see what’s behind door number one and who is getting a “zonk.”
International trade attorneys discuss court decisions this week that left many importers, manufacturers, and even casual observers wondering: What’s next?
President Trump cast a wide net with the proposed, reciprocal tariffs. The negotiating stage will be critical to determining the success of his strategy. And for those suffering tariff whiplash, don’t expect the pace of change to slow down just because the reciprocal tariffs are entering a negotiating phase.
The administration’s trade rollercoaster is moving at record speeds, running along the rails of innovation and expansion. But it can be confusing and difficult to keep up with. US manufacturers that follow these developments closely could benefit from the ride. Companies that miss new updates, or fail to accurately interpret their duty liability, could be left feeling queasy. Some rollercoasters are not for the faint of heart, and this one is a bit like Space Mountain. We are all riding without much ability to see the next turn or drop.
Day One of the second Trump administration did not bring tariffs, but it did signal that tariffs, and other major trade actions, are not far off.
This may be the most consequential six months for trade policy in recent memory. The wait to see what form Trump's actions take is almost over.
We focused on trade actions the second Trump administration might take in a prior column. Since then, we have learned more about the individuals who will be leading these efforts. Recent nominations reinforce the president-elect’s statements that tariffs will feature prominently in the second administration and that trade actions will be unveiled at lightning speed.
After a frenzied election cycle, Donald Trump will return to the White House with an amplified trade agenda.
The Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity (GFSEC) reaffirmed on Oct. 8 what domestic steel producers have long known—the threat of excess steel capacity never disappeared and is evolving. China’s steelmakers are boosting capacity and exports, echoing the 2016 global steel crisis. There is no doubt that China is successfully weaponizing excess capacity across many industries, and the fatal damage to domestic production and national security undermines the interests of all market-oriented countries. The question now is: How will GFSEC countries respond?
The United Kingdom and other countries are using the “green” label to subsidize bailouts of obsolete, inefficient, and excess capacity that should exit the market. US steelmakers have invested billions of dollars in technologies that curb greenhouse gas output. These investments have been market-based and led by EAF producers such as Nucor, Steel Dynamics, and CMC.
The chairman of a large American steel company called for Mexico to be dropped from USMCA at a steel industry conference last week. This follows earlier calls from members of Congress to reinstate Section 232 duties on Mexico. How did we get to this point?
In conjunction with President Biden’s visit to Vietnam in September 2023, Vietnam’s government petitioned the US Department of Commerce (DOC) for “market economy” treatment. This would be a major trade concession, as DOC has recognized for years that Vietnam’s economy does not operate according to market principles. However, graduating Vietnam to market economy status would […]
The Department of Commerce (DOC) has issued new rules to combat evolving "unfair" trade practice — including the unfair trade of steel products. They go into effect on Wednesday, April 24.